The stablecoin users institutions overlook.
Most stablecoin coverage follows institutional pilots. Some of the fastest growth is in supplier payments, money sent home and savings held in dollars. For those users, the stablecoin is the easy part.
Much of the writing about stablecoins comes from New York and London, and most of it is about institutions: tokenized funds that need a cash leg, banks testing settlement, payment companies running pilots. That story is real. But another kind of growth is happening outside the institutional spotlight.
In the twelve months to June 2026, the value of stablecoins sent across borders rose 77.5%, to US$220.3 billion, according to Chainalysis. That happened in a year when crypto prices fell sharply. The average cross-border transfer was about US$3,000, which Chainalysis reads as everyday use: paying suppliers, sending money home, moving savings out of volatile currencies. Its summary: “The bear market hit the price-sensitive half of crypto and left the payments half alone.”
- +77.5%Growth in cross-border stablecoin flows, to US$220.3B
- ~US$3,000Average cross-border stablecoin transfer
- 96%Share of peer-to-peer activity in stablecoins
- 6.36%Global average cost of sending US$200 abroad
- 8.46%Average cost into Sub-Saharan Africa
- 3%UN and G20 target for 2030
Where the users are
The clearest signal is in peer-to-peer activity, which Chainalysis measures as value moving directly between personal wallets within a country rather than through an exchange or other service. It finds that this channel is now 96% stablecoins. Sub-Saharan Africa led the world in growth on the strength of it, and Nigeria ranked first in the world for both peer-to-peer and cross-border flows.
Latin America’s crypto economy grew 9.8% while global activity fell 1.6%, and Chainalysis puts that down to a shift toward stablecoins and their use as a hedge against currency swings. In Brazil, which tops Chainalysis’s 2026 adoption index, central bank president Gabriel Galípolo said in February 2025 that crypto use had surged, with about 90% of the flow tied to stablecoins, according to Reuters.
None of this is new demand. It is old demand looking for a faster, cheaper route. In the third quarter of 2025, the World Bank’s global average for sending US$200 abroad was 6.36% of the amount sent. Into Sub-Saharan Africa, the most expensive region, it was 8.46%. The target the UN and the G20 set for 2030 is 3%.
Picture three people, invented here to illustrate those numbers. A designer in Lagos, invoicing a client in Berlin, who asks to be paid in digital dollars because they arrive in minutes and hold their value. An importer in São Paulo settling with a supplier abroad. A family in Istanbul keeping its savings in a dollar token because the lira keeps losing value. For each of them, the stablecoin is the easy part.
“Most of that is to buy things and to shop things from abroad.” — Gabriel Galípolo, Banco Central do Brasil
The conversion problem
The hard part is getting in and out of local currency. That is where the cost and the risk sit, and it comes down to three questions.
The spread: what a local exchange or a peer-to-peer trader charges to turn digital dollars into naira, reais or lira. It widens when dollars are scarce, which is exactly when people need them most.
The counterparty: who holds the money while it converts. Sometimes that is a licensed exchange. Sometimes it is a broker with no licence, or a stranger on a peer-to-peer platform.
The recourse: who answers when the local currency never arrives.
“Onchain settlement is fast, but it doesn’t solve the off-chain parts.” — Vincent Chok, First Digital, to Cointelegraph
What breaks
Three things break most often, and none of them is the blockchain.
Local rules. To a central bank managing scarce dollars, stablecoin flows can look like capital leaving, and flows it can’t see are harder to tax and police. Galípolo himself said that use for purchases abroad makes taxation and anti-money-laundering oversight harder. Brazil shows where that leads. Under rules published in November 2025, its central bank brought international payments made with stablecoins and other virtual assets into its foreign-exchange framework. Then, under Resolution BCB 561, in force from 1 October 2026, providers of regulated international payment services can no longer use virtual assets to pay or receive funds from their counterparties abroad (Lefosse). This is not a general ban on stablecoins in Brazil: the restriction covers how these providers settle with their foreign counterparties. Whether other central banks take a similar line as volumes grow is an open question.
Banking access. A local exchange needs a bank account to pay out local currency. Where banks won’t provide one, activity moves to peer-to-peer markets, where it is harder to see and harder to supervise.
Consumer protection. The new stablecoin laws in the United States and the European Union focus on the issuer: reserves backing every token, and a right to redeem. Canada’s draft regulations, which target fall 2027, go a step further: payment service providers holding stablecoins would need procedures to give users access to their funds if an issuer becomes insolvent. But none of these frameworks covers a conversion that fails in Lagos.
Issuer protections are only part of the picture. Much of the risk sits at the ramp.
What institutions misread
The first misreading is treating this as a crypto story. It is a dollar-access and payments story. The users want dollars that move like messages. The blockchain is how they get them, not why.
The second is looking at the wrong layer. Institutional analysis tends to focus on the issuer and the chain. The value in these markets sits in the ramps: local-currency liquidity, banking relationships, a licence in each market, and compliance that works at US$3,000 a transfer. Banks and payment companies already run much of that in their existing businesses.
The third is reading regulation as a green light. In the markets where demand is strongest, the regulator is often a central bank defending its currency. As Brazil shows, rules can tighten as volumes grow, and the firms that last will be the ones built to operate under them.
The users want dollars that move like messages. The blockchain is how they get them, not why.
What it means for Canada
Canada ranked tenth overall in Chainalysis’s 2026 adoption index, and seventh in the world for both cross-border and peer-to-peer flows. At home, Canada’s Real-Time Rail has been live since 9 November, with more financial institutions joining in the coming months. The gap is across borders, where the users in this piece pay the most.
So the question for Canada is not only which stablecoins will register once the Stablecoin Act takes effect. It is whether Canadian banks and payment companies want a role in the ramps: the part of the chain where these users actually pay, and where the risk sits.
We’d like to hear from people working on cross-border payments, stablecoin conversion or compliance at the ramp. What are we missing?
Write to us →This article is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute legal, regulatory, financial or investment advice.